Journal of International Studies

Since China forayed into African markets in the mid-2000s there has been ongoing speculation surrounding what China is doing in Africa, how it is doing it, and why. In media and policy circles the rhetoric relentlessly stresses ‘China  in  Africa,’ failing to realize that such lopsided and macro analyses obfuscate more than they illuminate. China’s political and economic engagement in Africa is deep. Between 2009 and 2012, China’s direct investment in Africa grew at an annual rate of 20.5 percent. While negligible in 2000, trade between the regions hit $195.8 billion in 2012 and is estimated to reach $385 billion by 2015. China’s engagement is also far-reaching. Public and private firms construct roads, hospitals, schools, stadiums and training centers for the exchange of technology and knowledge. State-owned energy companies explore for oil; manufacturing firms operate factories in remote African cities; and Chinese entrepreneurs sell knick-knacks in roadside shops. Th...

The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Congress was completed in Beijing earlier last week. Themed “deepening reform,” the Session had raised high expectations in and outside China about the new directions and initiatives the Party will adopt to address the country’s various problems, including its economic slowdown and other internal challenges. Foreign policy has not been a key topic for this domestically focused Session: Other than the creation of a “state security committee,” which is believed will cover foreign and national security issues, there is little mention of foreign affairs in the communique released after the Session on the November 12.  Despite this lack of a foreign policy focus, the decisions made at the Plenum, from an African observer perspective the meeting had potential implications for Africa. Globalization and the economic interdependence among countries have enhanced the butterfly effect of China’s own policy adjustments on others. As Africa’...

Last week The Gambia decided to cut ties with Taiwan. The implications could be significant. Image Credit: flickr/alveaux An air of uncertainty descended upon Taipei on November 14 when he tricolor Gambian flag was pulled down at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hours after rumors had emerged that Banjul had unilaterally severed ties with Taiwan. By day’s end, it was confirmed that Gambian President Yahya Jammeh had made the move to end nearly eighteen years of diplomatic relations. Taiwan  reciprocated  on November 18, leaving it with only three allies on the African continent, and 22 worldwide. The setback — this was Taipei’s first loss of a diplomatic ally since Malawi cut ties in January 2008 and established relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — immediately gave rise to speculation in Taipei as to whether the so-called  “diplomatic truce”  established between presidents Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan and Hu Jintao in China had come to an...

This past week South Africa’s Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe  attended  the fifth South Africa-China bi-national commission (BNC) in Beijing. There is nothing particularly shocking about this. China has worked hard in the last decade or more to establish relationships with African countries. And while we can argue (as myriad academics and journalists have) about the nature of this relationship — is it fundamentally unequal? Does it represent a version of Sino-imperialism? Does it provide a protection for African regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens? — The fact that the Chinese would want to engage with the most powerful economic and political power in sub-Saharan Africa seems obvious. But what is also interesting is that while by any economic measure China dwarfs South Africa, the relationship is far closer to one between semi-equals than it is the sort of asymmetrical relationship that plays out with China and most countries north of the Limpopo ...