Journal of International Studies

The U.S. needs to rethink its current position on reopening negotiations with Pyongyang.

Author:  Sheila A. Smith , Senior Fellow for Japan Studies September - October 2013 Vol.1, No.2

Iran's past covert enrichment activities—especially the revelation of Natanz in 2002 and Fordow in 2009—have raised concerns about whether other covert enrichment facilities exist in Iran today. In August 2010, then (and current) Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi claimed that the construction of an additional enrichment facility had started. However, operating a covert enrichment program is not an easy task. Several important decisions must be made which could have severe consequences for the program's survivability. For an external actor, there are three main tasks that would need to be undertaken in order to destroy a nuclear facility: detecting the facility, characterizing the facility and neutralizing it. Each of these tasks can be obstructed by different means. Detecting and characterizing a nuclear facility can be done in several ways: with satellite surveillance; utilizing technologies that can detect radiation, heat concentrations, sound or vibrations associ...

The relationship between North Korea and Mongolia does not usually make headlines, but Mongolian President Tsakhia Elbegdorj’s visit to the reclusive state this visit this week has brought this oft-overlooked East Asian bilateral relationship to the forefront. The visit also marks the very first meeting between a foreign head of state and Kim Jong-Un since his rise to power in 2011. Elbegdorj’s objectives during the visit are slightly unusual.  The Wall Street Journal  reports  that the president "will present his country’s history as an example of how to achieve sovereignty and economic development without relying on the use of force.” According to the Mongolian Foreign Ministry, Elbegdorj has considered the possibility of acting as a neutral mediator between the North and the outside world. Nevertheless, his visit demonstrates a closeness to North Korea that could be an asset for Mongolia’s relations with other states. According to certain experts, Mongolia pre...

Indonesia’s odd relationship with North Korea is back in the news as Jakarta seeks to take advantage of the changing economic conditions in the Hermit Kingdom. Last week Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa  spent three days  in North Korea where he met with his North Korean counterpart Pak Ui-chun and Kim Yong-nam, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the second highest ranking official in the DPRK.  Marty  made no attempt  to hide the fact that the primary purpose of his visit was to position Indonesia to take advantage of the economic changes North Korea is currently undertaking. Most notably, earlier this month  Pyongyang announced  that it was establishing special economic zones in every province in a bid to expand foreign investment in the country. At the beginning of his trip, Marty said that he had been sent to North Korea by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to help create a...

Late this September, the media  reported   widely  on a new study focused on the production of advanced gas centrifuges in North Korea. The analysis, presented in Seoul by Joshua Pollack and R. Scott Kemp of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was largely understood to indicate that advances in in-house North Korean scientific know-how would significantly hamper the effectiveness of traditional policy mechanisms intended to yield concessions from the Kim regime on the nuclear program.  Pollack, who also writes for  Arms Control Wonk , a blog on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, was pessimistic about the policy implications of the evidence uncovered in his research, stating that it may place a “verifiable denuclearization deal out of reach.” The evidence pointed to a concerted effort by North Korea to consolidate its nuclear production cycle. Specifically, Pollack and Kemp  found  that North Korea "is learning ...

Summary For two decades, the United States has sought to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Occasional success in freezing elements of that program, together with pledges by Pyongyang to end it, inspired hope that denuclearization could actually be achieved. Hope also grew from the belief that there existed a collection of incentives, including diplomatic normalization, security guarantees, and food assistance, which would convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions. These hopes have been dashed. U.S. policy has failed to achieve its objective. Important lessons have been learned from years of negotiating with Pyongyang. Among them is that North Korea probably was never serious about ending its nuclear and missile programs. We have learned that even the most robust package of inducements was insufficient to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuit. North Korea has shown itself willing to endure tough sanctions to preserve its nuclear and missile as...

Ten years after the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program were established and eight years after North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program, rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and allow the reentry of IAEA monitors in the September 19, 2005, joint statement, Pyongyang remains intransigent and intent on bolstering its capabilities. China is pushing for the resumption of the talks to ease mounting regional tensions, yet North Korean officials are only willing to return to the table if Pyongyang is not bound by preconditions. The United States and South Korea are unwilling to reconvene talks before North Korea takes concrete steps that demonstrate its seriousness about denuclearization. In this Q&A, Paul Haenle says that ideally, the parties will be able to return to the Six-Party Talks framework one day with all countries genuinely working toward the central goal of North Korea’s denuclearization. But the prospect of that ha...